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When a semi-autonomous car crashes and harms someone, how
are blame and causal responsibility distributed across the human and
machine drivers? In this article, we consider cases in which a pedes-
trian was hit and killed by a car being operated under shared control
of a primary and a secondary driver. We find that when only one
driver makes an error, that driver receives the blame and is consid-
ered causally responsible for the harm, regardless of whether that
driver is a machine or a human. However, when both drivers make
errors in cases of shared control between a human and a machine,
the blame and responsibility attributed to the machine is reduced.
This finding portends a public under-reaction to the malfunctioning
AI components of semi-autonomous cars and therefore has a direct
policy implication: a bottom-up regulatory scheme (which operates
through tort law that is adjudicated through the jury system) could
fail to properly regulate the safety of shared-control vehicles; instead,
a top-down scheme (enacted through federal laws) may be called for.
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1 Introduction
Every year, about 1.25 million people die worldwide in car crashes [WHO, 2017]. Laws
concerning principles of negligence currently adjudicate how responsibility and blame get
assigned to the individuals who injure others in these harmful crashes. The impending
transition to fully autonomous cars promises a radical shift in how blame and responsibility
will get attributed in the cases where crashes do occur, but most agree that little or
no blame will be attributed to the occupants in the car, who will, by then, be entirely
removed from the decision-making loop [Geistfeld, 2017]. However, before this era of fully
autonomous cars arrives, we are entering a delicate era of shared control between humans
and machines.
This new moment signals a departure from our current system – where individuals
have full control over their vehicles and thereby bear full responsibility for crashes – to
a new system where blame and responsibility may be shared between a human and a
machine driver. The spontaneous reactions people have to crashes that occur when a
human and machine share control of a vehicle has at least two direct industry-shaping
implications. First, at present, little is known about how the public is likely to respond
to crashes that involve both human and machine drivers. This uncertainty has concrete
implications: manufacturers price products to reflect the liability they expect to incur
from the sale of those products. If manufacturers cannot assess the scope of the liability
they will incur from semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles, that uncertainty will
translate to substantially inflated prices of AVs. Moreover, the rate of the adoption of
semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles will be proportional to the cost to consumers to
adopt the new technology [Geistfeld, 2017]. Accordingly, the uncertainty about the extent
of corporate liability for semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicle crashes is quantitatively
slowing down AV adoption, while millions of people continue to die in car crashes each
year. Clarifying how and when responsibility will be attributed to manufacturers in semi-
autonomous and autonomous car crashes will be a first step in reducing this uncertainty
and speeding the adoption of semi-autonomous and eventually autonomous vehicles.
The second direct implication of this work will be to forecast how a tort-based regulatory
scheme (which is decided on the basis on jury decisions) is likely to turn out. Put another
way, understanding how the public is likely to react to crashes that involve both a human
and a machine driver will give us a hint to how the laws will be shaped if we let jury
decisions create the regulations. If our works uncovers systematic biases that are likely to
impact juries and would impede the adoption of semi-autonomous and autonomous cars,
then it may make sense for federal regulations be put in place, which would preempt the
tort system from regulating these cars.
Already, semi-autonomous vehicle crashes are in the public eye. In May 2016, the first
deadly crash of a Tesla Autopilot car occurred and the occupant of the car was killed. In
a news release, Tesla explained: “Neither Autopilot nor the driver noticed the white side
of the tractor-trailer against a brightly lit sky, so the brake was not applied” [Tesla, 2016].
That is, both the machine driver and the human driver should have taken action (breaking
to avoid a truck making a left turn across traffic) and neither driver did. The mistakes
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(NHSTA) did an investigation of the incident and did not find Tesla at fault in the crash
[NHTSA, 2016], and a statement from the family of the killed occupant indicated that
they did not hold the car responsible for what happened [Reuters, 2017]. However, press
attention surrounding the incident was markedly skewed towards blaming the human driver
for the crash, with rumors quickly circulating that the driver had been watching a Harry
Potter movie (eg, [AP, 2016]), though upon further investigation it was discovered that
there was actually no evidence grounding this claim [Chong and Krok, 2017]. This set
of anecdotes around the Tesla crash begins to suggest a troubling pattern, namely, that
humans might be blamed more than their machine partners in certain kinds of semi-
autonomous vehicle crashes. Was this pattern a fluke of the circumstances of the crash and
the press environment? Or does it reflect something psychologically deeper that may color
our responses to human-machine joint action, and in particular, when a human-machine
pair jointly controls a vehicle?
What we are currently witnessing is a gradual increase toward full automation, going
through several steps of shared control between user and vehicle, which may take decades
due to technical and regulatory issues as well as attitudes of consumers towards adoption
[Munster, 2017, Kessler, 2017] (see Figure 1). Some vehicles can take control over the
actions of a human driver (e.g., Toyota’s ‘Guardian Angel’) to perform emergency maneu-
vers. Other vehicles may do most of the driving, while requiring the user to constantly
monitor the situation and be ready to take control (e.g., Tesla’s ‘Autopilot’).
Our central question is this: when a semi-autonomous car crashes and harms someone,
how are blame and causal responsibility distributed across the human and the machine
drivers? In this article, we consider cases in which a pedestrian was hit and killed by a
car being operated under shared control of a primary and a secondary driver. We consider
a large range of control regimes (see Figure 1), but the two main cases of interest are
the instances of shared control where a human is the primary driver and the machine
a secondary driver (“human-machine”) and where the machine is the primary driver and
the human the secondary driver (“machine-human”). We consider a simplified space of
scenarios in which (a) the main driver makes the correct choice and the secondary driver
incorrectly intervenes (“Bad Intervention”) and (b) the main driver makes an error and the
secondary driver fails to intervene (“Missed Intervention”). Both scenarios end in a crash.
For comparison, we also include analogous scenarios involving a single human driver (a
regular car) or a single machine driver (a full autonomous car) as well as two hypothetical
two-agent cars (driven by two humans or two machines).
In Bad Intervention cases, the primary driver (be it human or machine) has made a
correct decision to keep the car on course, which will avoid a pedestrian. Following this,
the secondary driver makes the decision to swerve the car into the pedestrian. In these
sorts of cases, we expect that the secondary driver (the only driver that makes a mistake)
will be blamed more than the first driver. What is less clear is if people will assign blame
and causal responsibility differently if this secondary driver is a human driver or a machine.
Recent research suggests that robots may be blamed more than humans for making the
same decisions in the same situations [Malle et al., 2015]. Likewise, people tend to lose
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Figure 1: Actions or action sequences for the different car types considered.
Outline arrows indicated an action by a human ‘H’, and solid arrows indicate
an action by a machine ‘M’. The top and bottom rows represent single-driver
cars, while all others represent dual-driver cars. A red arrow indicates a deci-
sion – whether action or inaction – with the avoidable death of a pedestrian as
the outcome, and a blue arrow indicates a decision that does not result in any
deaths. For example, the H+M type, which corresponds to NHTSA Level 2 and
is implemented as the Guardian Angel system, has a human main driver and a
machine standby driver. A Bad Intervention then involves the machine killing
the pedestrian by overriding (solid, angled, red arrow) the human’s non-lethal
staying of course (outline, straight, blue arrow). A Missed Intervention involves
the human staying on course to kill the pedestrian (outline, straight, red arrow)
without intervention from the machine (solid, straight, red arrow).
trust in an algorithm that makes an error faster than they lose trust in a human that
makes the same error [Dietvorst et al., 2015]. Together, this research suggests that the
machine drivers may be judged more harshly overall than human drivers who make the
same mistakes.
In Missed Intervention cases, the primary driver has made an incorrect decision to keep
5the car on course (rather than swerving), which would cause the car to hit and kill a pedes-
trian. The secondary driver then neglects to swerve out of the way of the pedestrian. In
these cases, the predictions for how subjects will distribute blame and causal responsibility
are less clear because both drivers make a mistake. As in the Bad Intervention cases, agent
type (human or machine) may have an effect on blame and causal responsibility ratings.
But unlike with Bad Intervention cases, Missed Intervention cases introduce the possibility
that driver role (primary or secondary) may also impact judgments. It is possible that
subjects may shift responsibility and blame either toward the agent who contributed the
most to the outcome (primary driver), or to the agent who had the last opportunity to act
(secondary driver; [Chockler and Halpern, 2004, Gerstenberg and Lagnado, 2012, Sloman
and Lagnado, 2015, Zultan et al., 2012]. Under some regimes – such as Toyota’s Guardian
Angel – the user does most of the driving, but the decision to override (and thus to act
last) pertains to the machine. Under others – such as Tesla’s autopilot – the machine does
most of the driving, but the decision to override pertains to the user.
In both Bad and Missed Intervention cases, we also investigate whether blame and causal
responsibility judgments can be explained by judgments of the competence of the drivers.
People sometimes give an agent less blame for an outcome when they believe that the agent
lacked the ability to perform that action reliably [Knobe, 2003]. If subjects think that the
machine driver in a semi-autonomous car is less competent than the human driver, they
may be less likely overall to assign blame to the machine (although it is also possible that
subjects may find a manufacturer more blameworthy for deploying an unreliable vehicle).
2 Results
Study 1 compared four kinds of cars with different regimes of control. Each car had a
primary driver, whose job it was to drive the car, and a secondary driver, whose job it was
to monitor the actions of the first driver and intervene when the first driver made an error.
The car architectures of central interest were human primary-machine secondary (“human-
machine”) and machine primary-human secondary (“machine-human”). We also included
human-human and machine-machine architectures for comparison. Study 2 compared the
human-machine and machine-human shared control cars with two different baseline cars:
a standard car, which is exclusively driven by a human, and a fully autonomous car, which
is exclusively driven by a machine. In Study 3, we used the same car regimes as in Study 2,
but the cases were dilemma scenarios in which the drivers had to choose between crashing
into a single pedestrian and crashing into five pedestrians. Across all studies and cases,
there were no significant effects of question (blame or causal responsibility), so the data
was collapsed across those variables for the analysis.
In all studies, in Bad Intervention cases, two predictors were entered into a regression
with rating as the outcome variable: (1) whether or not the driver made an error and (2)
driver type (human or machine). The main finding is that across all three studies, whether
or not the driver made an error was a significant predictor of ratings, whereas driver type
was not (for details, see Table 1). In other words, a driver that unnecessarily intervened,
leading to the death of a pedestrian was blamed more than a driver that operated on the
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Figure 2: Results from studies 1 and 2 for six car types (y-axis) in two cases; Bad
Intervention (left) and Missed Intervention (right). Ratings of blame
and causal responsibility are aggregated (collectively referred to as blame, hence-
forth). For Industry, when applicable, ratings of car and company are aggregated
(collectively referred to as Industry, henceforth). The y-axis represents the six
car types considered in the two studies, S1 and S2. Two car types, HM (human-
machine) and MH (machine-human), were considered in both studies. The y-axis
labels include the study and the car type. For example, S1-HM represents the
Human-Machine regime ratings collected in study 1. In the six car types, the
x-axis labeling of first driver refers to the main driver, and the last driver refers
to the secondary driver in dual-agent cars, and the sole driver in the single-agent
cars. Industry and User ratings are shown in blue, and red, respectively. For
Bad Intervention, only one agent has erred (the last driver). This agent (whether
User or Industry) is blamed almost the same across all car types, and is always
blamed more than the other agent (first driver) in every type (row). For Missed
Intervention, in dual-agent cars (rows 2-7), both agents have erred (by avoiding
intervention). When both agents are the same, that is both are humans or both
are machines (rows 2 and 7), both are blamed similarly. However, when hu-
man and machine are sharing control (critical cases, inside the dotted rectangle),
blame ratings of Industry drops significantly, regardless of the role of the machine
(main or secondary). This blame drop is not mirrored in the Bad Intervention
case, when only the machine has erred.
7Blame and Causal Responsibility
Bad Intervention Missed Intervention
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Human 1.192 1.810 -1.652 17.321∗∗∗ 13.268∗∗∗ 2.341
(1.500) (2.226) (0.939) (1.628) (2.526) (0.959)
Mistake 63.347∗∗∗ 56.011∗∗∗ 11.645∗∗∗
(1.497) (2.226) (0.939)
Human:Mistake 1.899 3.096 -0.092
(2.121) (3.148) (1.329)
Last Driver -1.444 -10.985∗∗∗ -0.244
(1.470) (2.526) (0.959)
Human:Last Driver -0.759 8.451 2.782
(2.309) (4.045) (1.356)
Constant 19.124∗∗∗ 22.138∗∗∗ 28.089∗∗∗ 60.316∗∗∗ 59.500∗∗∗ 36.740∗∗∗
(1.057) (1.586) (1.015) (1.634) (2.138) (1.083)
Subject Random Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Question Random Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 786 382 586 786 382 586
Observations 3,144 1,528 4,688 3,144 1,528 4,688
∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗,∗ significant at 0.01%, 0.1% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 1: Regression analysis of data collected in studies 1, 2, and 3 in the cases
of Bad Intervention and Missed Intervention. Studies 2 and 3 are limited
to shared-control regimes. “Human” refers to the type of agent in question (that
is, human as compared to the baseline, machine), “Mistake” refers to whether the
decision was a mistake (that is, the decision would have resulted in losing a life,
or losing more lives in study 3), and “Last Driver” refers to the driver role (that
is, the driver assumes the secondary role). All models include subject random
effects and question (blame or causal responsibility) random effects.
correct course – regardless of whether the driver was a human or machine.
In Missed Intervention cases, blame and responsibility judgments cannot depend on
whether or not a driver made an error because both drivers make errors in these cases.
The main finding from these cases is that driver type – whether the driver is a human
or machine – has a significant impact on ratings in Studies 1 and 2. (There is no effect
of driver type on ratings in Study 3, the dilemma cases. We come back to this point in
the Discussion.) Specifically, in these shared-control scenarios, where both human and
machine have made errors, the machine driver is consistently blamed less than the human
driver (see Figure 2).
This human-machine difference appears to be driven by a reduction in the blame at-
tributed to machines when there is a human in the loop. This is evident when comparing
both the human-machine and machine-human instances of shared control to the machine-
machine scenario. Note that the behaviors in these scenarios are identical, but how much
a machine is blamed depends on whether it is sharing control with a human or operating
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both the primary and secondary driver role. When the machine is the primary driver, it
is held less blameworthy when its secondary driver is a human (M = 57.22) compared to
when the secondary driver is also the machine (M = 68.02), t(760.6) = 5.05, p < .0001.
Similarly, when the machine is the secondary driver, it is held less blameworthy when its
primary driver is a human (M = 53.45), compared to when the primary driver is also the
machine, t(722.77) = −6.6042, p < .0001. The drop in machine responsibility in cases
where a human and machine share control of the car is also verified in Study 2, by com-
paring blame to the machine in the shared control cases with blame to the machine in
the Fully Autonomous car. In each case, blame to the machine in the shared control case
is significantly lower than blame to the machine in the Fully Autonomous car: Fully Au-
tonomous (M = 75.56) vs. Machine-Human (M = 59.50), t(754.63) = −7.3885, p < .0001;
vs. Human-Machine (M = 48.51), t(745.06) = 11.676, p < .0001.
Importantly, the effect observed in the Missed Intervention cases did not reflect a general
tendency to blame the machine less: When only one agent makes an error (the Bad Inter-
vention cases), an erring machine is blamed at the same level as an erring human. That is,
there is no effect of agent type on blame judgments for cases where humans and machines
share control in the Bad Intervention cases (Human: M = 53.36; Machine: M = 49.78;
t(1586) = −1.6391, p = 0.1014). Finally, assessments of competence did not mediate
blame judgments after a missed intervention (see Figure 3) – humans and machines were
rated as equally competent, both when these ratings were collected before reading about
the accident (Study 1) or after (Study 2).
Interestingly, for both types of mistakes (Bad interventions or Missed Interventions),
some amount of blame was attributed to machines and humans who were not even in the
decision-making loop (in the Regular Car and Fully Autonomous cases, respectively). This
suggests that passengers in fully autonomous vehicles may be perceived as implicitly ac-
cepting some degree of responsibility by even getting in the car at all. Likewise, traditional
(non-AI) cars and the car companies that sell them also are perceived as being somewhat
liable for the bad outcomes of crashes.
3 Discussion
Our central finding was that in cases where a human and a machine share control of the car,
less blame is attributed to the machine when both drivers make errors. The first deadly
Tesla crash (which killed the car’s occupant, mentioned in the Introduction) was similar
in structure to our Missed Intervention cases. In that case both the machine primary
driver and the human secondary driver should have taken action (braking to avoid a truck
making a left turn across traffic) and neither driver did. Our results suggests that the
public response that occurred to the crash – one that focused attention on an unfounded
rumor that the driver was exceedingly negligent – is likely to generalize to other dual-
error Missed Intervention-style cases, shifting blame away from the machine and towards
the human. Moreover, the convergence of our results with this real-world public reaction
seems to suggest that while we employed stylized, simplified vignettes in our research, our
findings show external validity.
9Figure 3: Competence ratings from studies 1 and 2, in the Missed Interven-
tion cases, for the two critical regimes (human-machine and machine-
human). In Study 1 (S1), ratings were collected before participants read about
the accident. In Study 2 (S2), they were collected after. For Industry, ratings of
car and company are aggregated (collectively referred to as Industry, henceforth).
The x-axis labeling of first driver refers to the main driver, and the last driver
refers to the secondary driver in dual-agent cars. Industry and User ratings are
shown in blue, and red, respectively. User and Industry receive similar compe-
tence ratings in each case. Ratings of both User and Industry drop at the same
rate when the question is asked after the scenario is presented.
Our central finding (diminished blame to the machine in dual-error cases) leads us to
believe that, while there may be many psychological barriers to self-driving car adoption
[Shariff et al., 2017], public over-reaction to dual-error cases is not likely to be one of them.
In fact, we should perhaps be concerned about public under -reaction. Because the public
are less likely to see the machine as being at fault in dual-error cases like the Tesla crash,
the sort of public pressure that drives regulation might be lacking. For instance, if we
were to allow the regulation of semi-autonomous vehicles to take place through jury-based
court-room decisions, we expect that juries will be biased to absolve the car manufacturer
of blame in dual-error cases, thereby failing to put sufficient pressure on manufacturers
to improve car designs. In fact, we have been in a similar situation before. Prior to the
1960s, car manufacturers enjoyed a large amount of liberty from liability when a car’s
occupant was harmed in a crash (because blame in car crashes was attributed to the
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driver’s error or negligence). Top-down regulation was necessary to introduce the concept
of “crash worthiness” into the legal system, that is, that cars should be designed in such
a way to minimize injury to occupants when a crash occurs. Only following these laws
were car manufacturers forced to improve their designs [Nader, 1965]. Here, too, top-
down regulation of semi-autonomous car safety might be needed to correct a public under-
reaction to crashes in shared-control cases. What, exactly, the safety standard should be
is still an open question, however.
If our data identifies a source of possible public over-reaction, it is for cars with a human
primary driver and a machine secondary driver in Bad Intervention-style cases. These are
the only cases we identified where the car receives more blame than the human. After all,
in these kinds of cars, it is possible for the machine to make an error that it is not the
human’s responsibility to correct. That is, the architecture of this car is as follows: the
machine’s job, as the secondary driver, is to correct any mistakes the human may make, but
if the machine makes a mistake, it is not the human’s job to correct it. (This is not true for
cars with the machine primary driver and a human secondary driver. In this kind of car,
when the machine makes an error, it is always the human’s job to correct it.) Therefore,
the car is blamed more than the human in Bad Intervention cases. It seems possible that
these sorts of cars may generate widespread public concern once we see instances of Bad
Intervention-style crashes in human-machine car regimes. This could potentially slow the
transition to fully autonomous vehicles if this reaction is not anticipated and managed
appropriately in public discourse and legal regulation. Moreover, manufacturers that are
working to release cars with a machine secondary driver should plan appropriately for the
likely legal fall-out for these unique cases where a machine driver receives more blame than
a human.
Our data portends the sort of reaction we can expect to semi-autonomous car crashes
at the societal level (for example, through public reaction and pressure to regulate). Once
we begin to see societal-level responses to semi-autonomous cars, that reaction may shape
incentives for individual actors. For example, people may want to opt into systems that
are designed such that, in the event of a crash, the majority public response will be to
blame the machine. Worse yet, people may train themselves to drive in a way that, if they
crash, the blame is likely to fall to the machine (for instance, by not attempting to correct
a mistake that is made by a machine over-ride). This sort of incentive shaping may already
be happening in the legal domain. Judges who make decisions about whether to release a
person from custody between arrest and a trial frequently rely on actuarial risk assessment
tables to help make their decision. Some suspect that judges may overly rely on the tables
as a way of diminishing their responsibility if a released person commits a crime. Recent
attention generated in response to such a case focused on the role of the algorithm rather
than the judge [Westervelt, 2017], indicating that the possibility of incentive shaping in
the legal domain is not so far-fetched.
Studies 1 and 2 looked at blame and causal responsibility attribution in cases where
one or both drivers made errors. Study 3 looked at dilemma scenarios where the drivers
faced the choice of running over either one or five pedestrians. While there is, in some
sense, an “optimal” outcome in these cases (corresponding to saving more lives), it is not
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obvious that it would (for example) count as an error to refuse to swerve away from five
pedestrians into a pedestrian that was previously unthreatened. In fact, the German Ethics
Commission on Automated and Connected Driving recently released a report indicating
that programming cars to trade off lives in this way would be prohibited. The report
states: “It is also prohibited to offset victims against one another. [. . .] Those parties
involved in the generation of mobility risks must not sacrifice non-involved parties.” Even
though participants in previous studies prefer to sacrifice one person who was previously not
involved than five (e.g., [Bonnefon et al., 2016]), the German Ethics Commission’s decision
underscores the fact that trading off lives in dilemma situations can be particularly fraught.
For this reason, and for continuity with previous work on the ethics of self-driving cars
[Bonnefon et al., 2016, Li et al., 2016] and in moral psychology more generally [Mikhail,
2011, Greene, 2014], we chose to investigate dilemma situations. Our findings that there is
no effect of driver type in these cases underscores the fact that findings about how blame
and responsibility are attributed after a crash may not generalize to less-clear dilemma
scenarios.
Some of our results fall in line with previous work on the psychology of causal inference.
In Bad Intervention cases, the primary driver (be it human or machine) makes a correct
decision to keep the car on course, which will avoid a pedestrian. Following this, the sec-
ondary driver makes the decision to swerve the car into the pedestrian. Our data show
that the secondary driver (the one that makes a mistake) is considered more causally re-
sponsible than the first driver. It is well established that judgments of causal responsibility
are impacted by violations of statistical and moral norms [Alicke, 2000, Gerstenberg et al.,
2015, Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009, Kominsky et al., 2015], and a mistake seems to count as
such a violation. That is, if something unusual or counter-normative happens, that event
is more likely to be seen as a cause of some effect than another event that is typical or
norm-conforming.
Other results, though, are more surprising in light of previous work on the psychological
of causal inference. In each of the three studies, subjects gave substantial blame and
responsibility to machine drivers, often at levels not different from the levels of blame
they ascribed to human drivers in similar roles. Research on the psychology of causal
attribution suggests that voluntary causes (causes created by agents) are better causal
explanations than physical causes [Hart and Honoré, 1985], which would imply that more
causal responsibility would be attributed to the human over the machine driver. On the
other hand, it remains an open question whether an AI that is operating a car counts as a
physical cause, an agent, something in between, or something else entirely [Gray et al., 2007,
Weisman et al., 2017]. Future work should investigate the mental properties attributed to
an AI that controls a car both in conjunction with a human or alone. Understanding the
sort of mind we perceive as dwelling inside an AI may help us understand and predict how
blame and causal responsibility will be attributed to it [Gray et al., 2012].
There is another reason why it is particularly surprising that the machine drivers are
attributed similar levels of blame to human drivers in the same role. There are various
ways that humans express moral condemnation. For example, we may call an action
morally wrong, say that a moral agent has a bad character, or judge that an agent is
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blameworthy. Judgments of blame typically track judgments of willingness to punish the
perpetrator [Cushman, 2008, 2015]. Are the participants in our study expressing that some
punishment is due to the machine driver of the car, whatever that may mean? Alternately,
is it possible that subjects’ expressions of blame indicate that some entity is deserving
of punishment that represents the machine (the company, or a human representative of
the company, such as the CEO). The similar blame judgments given to the car and the
car’s representatives (company, programmer) perhaps support this possibility. Finally, it
is possible that participants ascribe only non-moral blame to the machine, in the sense of
being responsible but not in a moral sense. We may say that a forest fire is to blame for
displacing residents from their homes without implying that punishment is due to anyone
at all.
Following these studies, the reason that subjects blame machine drivers less than human
drivers in Missed Intervention cases remains an open question. One possibility is that this
pattern is a feature of our uncertainty how to perceive the agential status of machines and
what it means to blame a machine at all. Once machines are a more common element in
our moral world and we interact with machines as moral actors, will this effect change?
Or will this finding be a lasting hallmark of the cognitive psychology of human-machine
interaction?
A final open question concerns whether the effects we report here will generalize to other
cases of human-machine interaction. Already we see fruitful human-machine partnerships
emerging with judges, doctors, military personnel, factory workers, artists, and financial
analyzes, just to name a few. We conjecture that we may see the patterns we report here
in domains other than autonomous vehicles, though each domain will have its own com-
plications and quirks as machines begin to become more subtly integrated in our personal
and professional lives.
Methods
Study 1
The data was collected in September 2017 from 786 participants (USA residents) recruited
from the Mechanical Turk platform. Participants were uniformly randomly allocated to
one of four conditions. Conditions varied the car type (human-human, human-machine,
machine-human, and machine-machine) in a 4-level between-subjects design. Each car had
a primary driver, whose job it was to drive the car, and a secondary driver, whose job it was
to monitor the actions of the first driver and intervene when the first driver made an error.
In each condition, participants first read a description of the car, and were then asked to
attribute competence to each of the two drivers on an 100-point scale anchored at “not
competent” and “very competent”. Participants then read two scenarios (presented in a
random order), one Bad Intervention case and one Missed Intervention Case. In each case,
the main driver decided to do nothing (kept the car on its track). The secondary driver
intervened in the Bad Intervention Cases (steering the car into another lane and killing a
pedestrian there). The secondary driver did not intervene (kept the car on its track) in
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the Missed Intervention cases (and killed a pedestrian walking in that lane, rather than
swerving and killing no one). After each scenario, participants were asked to indicate (on
an 100-point scale) to what extent they thought each driver was blame-worthy (from “not
blame-worthy” to “very blame-worthy”) and to what degree each of these two agents caused
the death of the pedestrian (from “very little” to “very much”). Questions were presented in
a randomized order. (See Supplemental Materials for text of the vignettes and questions).
At the end of the surveys, participants provided basic demographic information (e.g., age,
sex, income, political views).
Study 2
The data was collected in May 2017 from 779 participants (USA residents) recruited from
the Mechanical Turk platform. Participants were uniformly randomly allocated to one of
eight conditions. Conditions varied the car type (human only, human-machine, machine-
human, and machine only) and the industry representative (car and company), in a 4x2
between-subject multi-factorial design. In each condition, participants read two scenarios
(presented in a random order), one Bad Intervention case and one Missed Intervention
case. The two-driver scenarios were identical to those in Study 1. In the single-driver
scenarios, the sole driver in the Bad Intervention cases steered the car off its track (killing
a pedestrian) rather than keeping the car on track and killing no one. The sole driver in
the Missed Intervention cases kept the car on its track (killing a pedestrian) rather than
swerving into the adjacent lane and killing no one. After each scenario, participants were
asked to attribute causal responsibility, blameworthiness, and competence to two agents:
the human in the car and a representative of the car (the car itself or the manufacturing
company of the car, depending on the condition). All other features of Study 2 were the
same at those in Study 1.
Study 3
The 973 participants (USA residents only) were recruited from the Mechanical Turk plat-
form. Participants were uniformly randomly allocated to one of twelve conditions. Con-
ditions varied the car type (human only, human-machine, machine-human, and machine
only) and the industry representative (car, company, and programmer), in a 4x3 between-
subject multi-factorial design. In each condition, participants read two scenarios (presented
in a random order), one Bad Intervention case and one Missed Intervention case. These
scenarios were identical to those presented in Studies 1 and 2, except that the drivers in
the Bad Intervention cases swerved out of the way of one pedestrian and killed five and
the drivers in the Missed Intervention cases kept the car on track to kill five pedestrians
rather than swerving to kill one. After each scenario, participants were asked to attribute
causal responsibility and blameworthiness to two agents: the human in the car and a rep-
resentative of the car (the car itself, the company, or the programmer, depending on the
condition). All other features of Study 3 were identical to those of Study 2.
In all studies, to get our final sample, we excluded any subject who did not (i) complete
all measures within the survey, (ii) transcribe (near-perfectly) a 169-character paragraph
14 Awad, Levine et al.
from an image (used to exclude non-serious Turkers), and (iii) have unique TurkID per
study (all records with a recurring MTurk ID were excluded).
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Supplemental Information
A. Full Results
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the mean and the 95% confidence interval for each condition for
studies 1, 2 and 3.
Table 2: Study 1 results. Mean and 95% confidence interval for each condition.
Scenario Type Car Agent Agent Agent is the Mean 95% CI
Type Erred? last driver?
Bad Intervention HH User No No 21.35 17.98–24.72
Bad Intervention HH User Yes Yes 84.17 81.18–87.17
Bad Intervention HM Industry Yes Yes 83.85 81.05–86.64
Bad Intervention HM User No No 19.30 16.37–22.23
Bad Intervention MH Industry No No 16.21 13.59–18.82
Bad Intervention MH User Yes Yes 86.90 84.46–89.34
Bad Intervention MM Industry No No 22.10 18.86–25.34
Bad Intervention MM Industry Yes Yes 81.09 78.05–84.12
Missed Intervention HH User Yes No 73.53 70.21–76.86
Missed Intervention HH User Yes Yes 73.96 70.95–76.98
Missed Intervention HM Industry Yes Yes 53.45 49.81–57.09
Missed Intervention HM User Yes No 77.65 74.63–80.67
Missed Intervention MH Industry Yes No 57.22 53.73–60.7
Missed Intervention MH User Yes Yes 72.73 69.72–75.75
Missed Intervention MM Industry Yes No 67.51 64.19–70.82
Missed Intervention MM Industry Yes Yes 68.53 65.23–71.82
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Table 3: Study 2 results. Mean and 95% confidence interval for each condition.
Scenario Type Car Agent Agent Agent is the Mean 95% CI
Type Erred? last driver?
Bad Intervention H Industry No No 17.56 14.63–20.49
Bad Intervention H User Yes Yes 84.54 81.68–87.4
Bad Intervention HM Industry Yes Yes 78.15 74.88–81.42
Bad Intervention HM User No No 23.95 20.76–27.14
Bad Intervention M Industry Yes Yes 80.61 77.94–83.28
Bad Intervention M User No No 29.58 26.45–32.7
Bad Intervention MH Industry No No 22.14 19.15–25.13
Bad Intervention MH User Yes Yes 83.06 80.21–85.9
Missed Intervention H Industry No No 36.30 32.9–39.69
Missed Intervention H User Yes Yes 75.73 72.84–78.62
Missed Intervention HM Industry Yes Yes 48.52 45–52.03
Missed Intervention HM User Yes No 72.77 69.53–76.01
Missed Intervention M Industry Yes Yes 75.56 72.69–78.43
Missed Intervention M User No No 32.63 29.45–35.82
Missed Intervention MH Industry Yes No 59.50 56.35–62.65
Missed Intervention MH User Yes Yes 70.23 67.2–73.27
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Table 4: Study 3 results. Mean and 95% confidence interval for each condition.
Scenario Type Car Agent Agent Agent is the Mean 95% CI
Type Erred? last driver?
Bad Intervention H Industry No No 30.59 28.58–32.6
Bad Intervention H User Yes Yes 35.86 33.88–37.85
Bad Intervention HM Industry Yes Yes 39.73 37.93–41.54
Bad Intervention HM User No No 26.44 24.92–27.96
Bad Intervention M Industry Yes Yes 32.43 30.53–34.32
Bad Intervention M User No No 18.69 17.16–20.21
Bad Intervention MH Industry No No 28.09 26.48–29.69
Bad Intervention MH User Yes Yes 37.99 36.21–39.77
Missed Intervention H Industry No No 30.72 28.78–32.67
Missed Intervention H User Yes Yes 38.12 36.06–40.18
Missed Intervention HM Industry Yes Yes 36.50 34.78–38.21
Missed Intervention HM User Yes No 39.08 37.27–40.89
Missed Intervention M Industry Yes Yes 35.50 33.56–37.43
Missed Intervention M User No No 19.08 17.59–20.58
Missed Intervention MH Industry Yes No 36.74 35.03–38.45
Missed Intervention MH User Yes Yes 41.62 39.78–43.45
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B. Vignettes
Study 1
Figure 4: Vignette for Human-Machine with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 5: Vignette for Human-Machine with Bad Intervention.
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Figure 6: Vignette for Machine-Human with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 7: Vignette for Machine-Human with Bad Intervention.
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Figure 8: Vignette for Human-Human with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 9: Vignette for Human-Human with Bad Intervention.
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Figure 10: Vignette for Machine-Machine with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 11: Vignette for Machine-Machine with Bad Intervention.
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Study 2
Figure 12: Vignette for Human-Machine with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 13: Vignette for Human-Machine with Bad Intervention.
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Figure 14: Vignette for Machine-Human with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 15: Vignette for Machine-Human with Bad Intervention.
Figure 16: Vignette for Human only (Regular Car) with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 17: Vignette for Human only (Regular Car) with Bad Intervention.
Figure 18: Vignette for Machine only (Fully Autonomous) with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 19: Vignette for Machine only (Fully Autonomous) with Bad Intervention.
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Study 3
Figure 20: Vignette for Human-Machine with Missed Intervention.
Figure 21: Vignette for Human-Machine with Bad Intervention.
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Figure 22: Vignette for Machine-Human with Missed Intervention.
Figure 23: Vignette for Machine-Human with Bad Intervention.
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Figure 24: Vignette for Human only (Regular Car) with Missed Intervention.
Figure 25: Vignette for Human only (Regular Car) with Bad Intervention.
Figure 26: Vignette for Machine only (Fully Autonomous) with Missed Intervention.
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Figure 27: Vignette for Machine only (Fully Autonomous) with Bad Intervention.
Questions
In all vignettes, after each scenario, four questions are asked: (Blame vs. Causal Respon-
sibility) x (User vs. Industry). Industry is car in study 1; car or company in study 2; and
car, company or programmer in study 3. See Figure 28.
In study 2, in addition to the four questions above two more questions about competence
are also asked (competence of Hank and competence of industry representative). See Figure
29.
In study 1, competence questions are asked separately before respondents are presented
with scenarios. In each condition, a description of the car regime is provided, and two
questions about competence (User vs. Industry). See Figures 30 – 33.
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Figure 28: Questions asked for all studies and all cases, where Industry is the Robocar.
Robocar is replaced with robocar company or robocar programmer in other
cases.
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Figure 29: Competence questions asked in study 2 along with the other four questions,
where Industry is the car company.
Figure 30: Description and Competence questions about Machine-Human from study 1.
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Figure 31: Description and Competence questions about Human-Machine from study 1.
Figure 32: Description and Competence questions about Human-Human from study 1.
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Figure 33: Description and Competence questions about Machine-Machine from study 1.
